Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of threshold traitor tracing for digital content where, by embedding appropriate digital patterns into the distributed content, it is possible to trace and identify the source of unauthorised redistribution.
Introduction
Fingerprinting (see [4, 2, 1] ) is a technique that aims to prevent the unauthorized redistribution of digital content. Very close copies of a digital document are made available to a large number of authorized users. The locations where the copies differ are where the fingerprint has been embedded into the digital object. Malicious users attempt to discover the fingerprint and alter it to construct rogue copies which will still "function". The document is assumed to be a string over a finite alphabet, with the fingerprint being a randomly spread-out substring of the former, but much shorter than the document itself. Traitor Tracing (see [5, 3] ) schemes enable the tracing of the user(s) whose fingerprints were used to construct the rogue copies. Here we are interested in tracing more powerful attacks as in the example below. In a narrow attack, the attackers can choose any symbol which already appears in their copies at that location-see Tardos [11] for an efficient solution, and [9, 10] for earlier work. In an erasure attack, the attackers erase symbols at locations where their copies mismatch. In a hybrid attack, the attackers can switch between the narrow and erasure attacks, position by position. In a wide attack they can choose any symbol from the alphabet or erase the locations where their copies differ. Clearly an attacker who can carry out the weaker attacks can also carry out a combination of them, so this model is reasonable.
Attacks on Fingerprinting Schemes
The symbol v denotes a vector; v (i) is its i-th coordinate. We assume the finite alphabet Q to be F q , wherever convenient.
Attack Taxonomy
We identify each user with the unique codeword that she has been assigned. A coalition is a set of attackers. We then ask: (i) What can a coalition do? (ii) How large can a coalition be?
Definition 2. (a) Let C(M, ω) denote the collection of all possible coalitions of
M with size at most ω:
(d) For any code M, the set of all wide descendants from coalitions of size ≤ ω is denoted:
The special cases of the wide attack have been informally defined in Example 1 due to space constraints. The narrow, erasure and hybrid attacks need to be defended against if we are to defend against the wide attack. We have recently considered this hierarchy of attacks [7, 8] and reduced the wide attack to a hybrid attack-by the method of alphabet boosting-at the cost of expanding the codelength. Here, we focus on the details of code design for tracing the hybrid attack, after a brief overview of the attack hierarchy, and refer the reader to [8] for the details of tracing the erasure attack and the wide attack reduction.
Defending Against the Various Attacks

Tracing the Hybrid Attack
We first define some concepts from the erasure attack.
Definition 3 (Coalition Erasure Profile). Consider a coalition
The erasure profile E T also obeys
, E f is the erasure profile of a coalition containing only the codeword f . Given d ∈ Edesc(T ), the erasure profile is simply the sets of pairs (i, d
(i) ) of the descendant that haven't been erased:
To construct a code that is resistant to an erasure attack we require: (i) E T must be nonempty for all coalitions T ; (ii) To ensure that every coalition can be uniquely defined by E T , we impose the simple condition:
Definition 4 (Partial Trace). Given the Erasure profile of a coalition E T , the partial trace for the coalition T on the pairs
For a hybrid descendant d, we define the corresponding profile as the "tracing profile". 
Note that E T represents the set of (coordinate, value) that a coalition can't erase, whereas I d is the set of (coordinate, value) that a coalition has not deleted.
Definition 6 (Trace of hybrid attack). The trace of a descendant
The intersection of all such coalitions gives all codewords required to construct the descendant d, i.e.,
It has been noted in [7] that the hybrid attack can be defended against by using codes described in the next section, which have been designed against the erasure attack, for slightly smaller coalition sizes. We don't consider this further in this paper.
Vector Space Block Design Codes (VSBDCs)
A VSBDC is a type of Resolvable BIBD [12] , constructed by using the set of all (ω − 1)−dimensional quotient vector spaces of a vector space V. For this construction, we need a method of mapping the partitions of a resolvable design to coordinates of the codewords. 
Definition 7 (Partition Mapping
Given a partition mapping ζ : A → I m , we can construct a set of codewords or "partition vectors" from a Resolvable BIBD.
Definition 8 (Partition Vectors). Let A be a finite set with a set of N ordered partitions
B = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N }. A
partition vector is a vector of length N generated from A and B and is denoted v B (a). Each coordinate i of v B (a) specifies the segment (by index) that contains the element a in the partition
We can construct a partition vector for each a ∈ A. We call the set of all partition vectors a "block design code".
Definition 9 (Block Design Code). Given an ordered set of partitions
is the set of all partition vectors v B (a) where a ∈ A. i.e.,
The type of block design code we are interested in will be called a "vector space block design code".
Definition 10 (Vector Space Block Design Codes). A Vector Space Block Design Code (VSBDC), denoted BDC(V, B V,k ), is a block design code where the set of treatments is a vector space V and the block design is the set of quotient vector spaces B V,k of dimension k.
The set of quotient vector spaces B V,k is a resolvable balanced incomplete block design (RBIBD). We now give an example of a VSBDC with ω = 3.
The set A T , defined below, is the V-representation of the set of partition vectors in the coalition T .
Definition 11. Consider a coalition T of ω codewords from the vector space block design code BDC(V, B V,ω−1 ). Then A T consists of all vectors a in
We define the partial trace B i,x as the set which can be used to construct the descendant, but includes codewords which may not have actually taken part in the coalition. We characterize the partial trace below. 
Theorem 13. Let M be the vector space block design code
If
then it must be a vector subspace of V with dimension k. Let H = [A T ] V be that vector subspace. Moreover, every block in the design B V,ω−1 that contains the vector subspace H , must also be a vector subspace of V, since it must contain the zero vector. All the blocks B i,x that contain H (which themselves are vector subspaces of V) can be expressed as a direct sum
where T i,x extends H to B i,x . So the set {B i,x : (i, x) ∈ E T }, is the set of all vector subspaces in V containing the subspace H with dimension ω − 1. The intersection of all subspaces B i,x is
where intersection of all allowable T i,x is the trivial vector subspace {0}.
Note that the VSBDC has the desirable property that any coalition of size ω must have at least one coordinate where all codewords are equal (since every coalition T must have a non empty erasure profile E T ). This property enables a partial trace of the descendant which will contain the coalition plus other codewords (spoof words). We use concatenated codes to get around this problem. 
where B is the set of quotient vector spaces B V,k , and
We cannot use a linear code as M O as this re-introduces the problem of spoof words at the outer code level. In [8, 7] , we have introduced δ-nonlinear codes-in the form of modified GRS codes-to get around this problem. These are codes where the sum of δ or fewer codewords is not a codeword, and are obtained by applying a special type of permutation polynomial to Generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) codewords-see [6] for details on GRS codes-which are MDS codes attaining the Singleton bound, and have length N, dimension k and minimum distance N − k + 1. 
Definition 15 (Modified GRS Code
where f (x) ranges over all polynomials of degree ≤ k with coefficients from F q .
The δ-nonlinearity property ensures that the partial trace of the concatenated code would only contain the coalition T plus other non-codewords which can be discarded leaving only the coalition-see the concluding section for further discussion. We give an example of a concatenated vector space block design code (CVSBDC) below. 
. Note that, if the inner code M I is a VSBDC, then by Theorem 13 the concatenated partial trace is Cptrace(
The concatenated partial trace is useful for viewing the code at the inner level; at the outer level, we need to use a "coset image". Definition 17 (Coset Image). Consider F n q and F q n . For a given scalar preserving homomorphism ϕ :
is:
where
The components λ b are over the subfield F q and not the field F q n . The coset image contains ≤ q |A|−1 elements of F q n . We now show that we can construct the concatenated partial trace by using a coset image on the outer code M O . 
Definition 18 (Coset Generator
Proof. The coalitions T (i) are obtained from the spectrum of T O at the i-th coordinate;
Using the definitions of a coset generator (see Definition 18), a coset image (see Definition 17) and some algebraic manipulation, we obtain:
This gives the required result.
We now have a coset image [T O ] ϕ that can be used to construct the concatenated partial trace in Definition 16. But for it to be of any use for tracing purposes, we require that it be the only coset image that constructs the concatenated partial trace. 
Conclusions and Discussion
We have investigated powerful attacks against fingerprinting schemes used for securing digital content and described new types of codes which can be used to There are efficient algorithms for decoding Reed Solomon codes, which could be applied to the δ-nonlinear Generalized Reed Solomon codes. The algorithms for decoding the BIBD based component of the concatenated codes could be based on linear algebra operations for computing cosets and subspaces, and thus have a priori complexity no worse than a small power of the codelength, which is given by an appropriate q−binomial coefficient. More precisely, if V is an ndimensional vector space over the field F q , the number of vector subspaces with dimension k, |S V,k |, is given by the q-Binomial Coefficient:
and a small power-between 2 and 3-of this quantity will determine the maximum complexity of the operations used-see also Definition 14.
It remains an open problem to obtain more efficient decoding algorithms for the design based codes. One question raised during the review process of this paper is the complexity of generating the VSBDCs and the δ-nonlinear codes-which together generate the CVSBDCs. The VSBDCs can be generated recursively by generating all the relevant vector subspaces, hence by complexity essentially proportional to the size of the above q-Binomial coefficient. It has turned out that a set of special permutation polynomials, which are used to obtain the δ-nonlinear codes can also be easily generated. More precisely, for the MGRS codes in Definition 15, we can use the mapping
where ξ is a special type of permutation polynomial, in order to preserves the distance between all modified codewords and obtain the desired δ-nonlinearity property. We omit the details due to the limitations on space but exhibit a small table of such polynomials, which are obtained by a simple algorithmic procedure and after an efficient randomized procedure. See section V in [8] for more details.
Here, we display a table with suitable choices of permutation polynomials to construct δ-nonlinear codes.
The main contribution of this paper is an explicit-nonrandomized-coding construction for addressing erasure and other attacks in digital fingerprinting.
